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Ripeness and the Constitution 
Gene R. Nichol, Jr. t 
In a decade and a half of decision making, the record of the 
Burger Court proved, in many ways, a surprising one. Neither the 
conservative monolith suggested by its early "Nixon Court" label, 
nor the enthusiastic heir of its predecessor's egalitarian agenda, the 
Court constructed a mixed legacy of activism and restraint.1 Al-
though the Court's overriding approach to constitutional problems 
has proven difficult to characterize,2 recurrent themes are clearly 
ascertainable.3 This article will touch on one particular, perhaps 
distinctive, legacy of the Burger Court: the constitutionalization of 
the law of federal justiciability." 
For decades prior to the 1970s, principles of jus-
ticiability-standing, mootness, ripeness, political questions, and 
t Cutler Professor of Constitutional Law and Director, Institute of Bill of Rights Law, 
Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary. 
I received particularly helpful comments on earlier drafts of this essay from Martin 
Redish, Erwin Chemerinsky, and William Marshall. This paper was delivered at a faculty 
forum at the Northwestern University School of Law in the spring of 1986. Remarks re-
ceived on that occasion contributed substantially to subsequent drafts. I would also like to 
thank Andrea Caruso for research and editing assistance. Millie Arthur helped make the 
manuscript more comprehensible. 
1 See Gene R. Nichol, Jr., An Activism of Ambivalence, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 315 (1984) 
(reviewing Victor Blasi, The Burger Court: The Counterrevolution That Wasn't (1983)); 
Norman Dorsen, The United States Supreme Court: Trends and Prospects, 21 Harv. Civ. 
Rts.-Civ. Lib. L. Rev. 1 (1986). 
• See Blasi, The Burger Court at 198-217 (cited in note 1). 
3 See generally Nichol, 98 Harv. L. Rev. at 319-22 (cited in note 1); Blasi, The Burger 
Court (cited in note 1). 
• Article III, § 2 of the United States Constitution states in part: "The judicial Power 
shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of 
the United States, and Treaties made under their Authority; ... to Controversies between 
two or more states." These phrases have been interpreted to encompass the "case or contro-
versy" requirement of article III. To limit repetition, I have used the ternlS "case or contro-
versy" and "article III" interchangeably. There is, of course, more to article III than the case 
or controversy requirement. The provision sets forth the "arising under" jurisdiction, the 
constitutional diversity jurisdiction, and so on. In this essay, however, I consider only the 
case or controversy component of article III. 
Throughout this article, I use the term "jurisdiction" in a limited sense. This essay 
addresses the constitutional and quasi-constitutionallimitations on the power of the federal 
courts found in article III. Accordingly, "jurisdiction" here refers to limits on federal power 
that relate to the case or controversy requirement, rather than other jurisdictional barriers 
such as subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction. 
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the like11--inhabited a hazy middle ground between prudential con-
cern and constitutional mandate. If traditional limits on the exer-
cise of judicial power operated restrictively, their claimed ties to 
the Constitution were at best indistinct and not fully articulated.6 
The Warren Court, in response to the fused justiciability doctrines 
it encountered, launched an energetic, if ultimately imperfect, at-
tempt both to segregate and to liberalize the various strands of ju-
risdictional analysis. 7 
The resulting expansion of judicial purview caused the Burger 
Court immediate concern. 8 The reaction of the justices over the 
course of the past decade has been, if not consistent,9 at least di-
rected. The Court has fortified the barriers of standing, mootness, 
and ripeness faced by federal litigants.10 Indeed, the Burger Court 
has suggested quite pointedly that these justiciability doctrines are 
rooted in, and demanded by, the Constitution itself-specifically, 
the "case or controversy" requirement of article III.11 By limiting 
intervention to the protection of concrete, particularized, continu-
• For examples of other principles the Supreme Court has used in denying federal ju-
risdiction, see United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302, 305 (1943) (feigned or collusive 
cases); Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 446 (1965) (adequate and independent state 
ground); Moore v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 47 (1971) (no real issue 
between parties). 
• Consider, for example, the constitutional status of Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 
447, 486-89 (1923) (dismissing taxpayer challenge to allegedly illegal appropriation on 
ground that allowing such suits would encroach upon the legislative power). 
7 See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 91-106 (1968) (Frothingham does not bar tax-
payer suits involving establishment clause challenges to public expenditures); Association of 
Data Processing Service v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 156-58 (1970) (enlarging class of persons 
with standing to challenge administrative rulings). 
• See the Chief Justice's opinion in Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15 (1972), reversing the 
court of appeals's finding of jurisdiction on the ground that the litigant's theory of standing 
would make the federal courts "virtually continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness 
of Executive action." 
• Two notable exceptions-granting liberal access-are Duke Power Co. v. Carolina 
Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 68-82 (1978); and Watt v. Energy Action Educational 
Foundation 454 U.S. 151, 160-62 (1981). 
•• See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-502 (1975) (standing requires, among 
other things, distinct and palpable injury); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 171-
80 (1974) (denying taxpayer standing to challenge failure to publish CIA budget); DeFunis v 
Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 316-20 (1974) (law student's challenge to affirmative action program 
ruled moot); Williamson County Regional Planning Comm. v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 
105 S.Ct. 3108 (1985) (restrictive ripeness ruling). 
11 The Burger Court clearly viewed standing as a doctrine of constitutional stature. See 
Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 39,44-46 (1976) ("EKWRO"); 
Warth, 422 U.S. at 502-08. The same is true of the mootness doctrine, see DeFunis, 416 U.S. 
at 316-20, and the ripeness doctrine, see, e.g., Babbitt v. Farm Workers, 442 U.S. 289, 297 
(1979). See also notes 64-67 and accompanying text below. 
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ing injuries, 12 article III assertedly restrains federal courts from 
moving beyond the scope of the "judicial Power."~3 Article III re-
quirements have been designed, as a group, to ensure the 
"proper-and properly limited-role"14 of the unelected federal ju-
diciary in our democratic system of government. 
This essay will focus on one aspect of the Burger Court's arti-
cle III legacy: the ripeness doctrine. The subject of little academic 
comment, at least compared to other components of justiciability,u~ 
the ripeness analysis employed by modern federal courts has met 
with consistent approval.16 However, the Burger Court's decision 
to constitutionalize ripeness poses special problems for the clarity 
and workability of the doctrine. It also bodes poorly for the com-
prehensibility of the case or controversy requirement of article III. 
Aspects of the ripeness doctrine are anomalous for a require-
ment rooted in the Constitution. The demands of the principle 
vary greatly according to the dictates and posture of the claim on 
the merits. In operation, therefore, the ripeness requirement often 
is indistinguishable from actionability analysis. Other cases use 
this requirement to ensure that judicial decision making is carried 
on with the requisite factual foundation, or under a time frame 
that avoids premature interference with the regulatory actions of 
other government bodies. In short, except for those instances in 
which ripeness analysis is employed to eschew advisory opin-
ions-a task performed more directly by the standing require-
ment-the doctrine serves goals that the Court has typically char-
acterized as prudential rather than constitutional. It aims to fine-
tune the decision-making process of the federal courts and to mea-
sure the demands of substantive constitutional principle. These 
tasks are essential. They are not best performed, however, by an 
12 EKWRO, 426 U.S. at 39, 44-46; Warth, 422 U.S. at 502-08; DeFunis, 416 U.S. at 316-
20. 
12 Article III provides, in part, that the "judicial Power" extends to the determination 
of various "Cases" and "Controversies." 
14 Warth, 422 U.S. at 498. 
15 The literature on standing is voluminous. See, for example, the authorities listed in 
Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Rethinking Standing, 72 Cal. L. Rev. 68, 68 n.3 (1984). The mootness 
doctrine has received attention as well. See, e.g., Don B. Kates, Jr. and William T. Barker, 
Mootness in Judicial Proceedings: Toward a Coherent Theory, 62 Cal. L. Rev. 1385 (1974); 
Comment, A Search for Principles of Mootness in the Federal Courts, 54 Tex. L. Rev. 1289 
(1976). 
11 See, e.g., Kenneth Culp Davis, 4 Administrative Law Treatise § 25:2 at 351 (2d ed. 
1983). Consider also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Sidney A. Shapiro, and Paul R. Verkuil, Admin-
istrative Law and Process 199-202 (1985); Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and Ed-
ward H. Cooper, 13A Federal Practice and Procedure § 3532 at 112 (2d ed. 1984) ("Federal 
Practice"). 
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overarching barrier to the exercise of judicial power. 
It is my view, therefore, that the Court's effort to bring the 
ripeness doctrine under the umbrella of the case or controversy re-
quirement is unfortunate. Not only is constitutionalization incon-
sistent with the doctrine's premises, but it implies a rigidity and 
formalism that are at odds with the doctrine's operation. It threat-
ens further to complicate and confuse the case or controversy re-
quirement as well. Ripeness analysis is intertwined with the pos-
ture, factual record, and substantive standards of the claim being 
litigated. It cannot easily be encompassed by an independent, uni-
form constitutional limitation on judicial authority. 
My efforts will explore both the nature of the ripeness stan-
dard and its relationship to the Court's vision of article Ill. In or-
der to examine the propriety of making ripeness an article III re-
quirement, it is necessary initially to consider briefly the Burger 
Court's vision of the case or controversy standard. Part I of this 
essay argues that the Court consistently turned to the concept of 
"distinct and palpable injury"17 as constituting the "essence" of 
the case or controversy requirement. By demanding the demon-
stration of concrete harm to trigger judicial power, this injury stan-
dard is designed to ensure that justiciability analysis is not influ-
enced by the validity, importance, or political desirability of the 
claim on the merits.18 
Part II turns to the workings of the ripeness doctrine. After 
examining the goals and methodologies of the various types of 
ripeness decisions, I conclude that they have little in common with 
article III jurisprudence. The chief purposes of the ripeness inquir-
ies-to fine-tune both the substantive claim and judicial decision 
making-are intimately connected with the merits of the particular 
claim, an inquiry that the uniform requirement of concrete injury 
tries to avoid. 
Finally, in part III, I argue that a marriage of ripeness and 
article III is flawed. Not only is it inconsistent with the Court's 
depiction of the case or controversy requirement, it is a wrong turn 
analytically-both for ripeness and for article III. 
I. THE BURGER COURT AND ARTICLE III 
The decisions of the Burger Court implementing the case or 
controversy requirement can reasonably be described as inconsis-
'
7 See Warth, 422 U.S. at 501. 
18 Id. at 499-500. 
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tent. 19 The Court has been quite consistent, however, in its de-
scriptions of article III's demands. In Valley Forge v. Americans 
United for Separation of Church and State, it explained that a 
"recent line of decisions . . . has resolved the ambiguity" over the 
fundamental content of article III.20 At an "irreducible minimum" 
the Constitution requires "actual or threatened injury as a result of 
the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant."21 This individual 
injury standard, as Justice Powell has written, forms the "essence" 
of the case or controversy requirement.22 In explaining the con-
tours of the requirement, modern standing rulings have provided 
the fullest exploration of the aims and rationale of the article III 
standard, as well as the distinctions to be drawn between the con-
stitutional and prudential limits on the exercise of judicial power. 
As the framers envisioned, article III limits the authority of 
the federal courts to the consideration of cases of "a Judiciary na-
ture."23 Of course, describing the parameters of the judicial case 
requirement has proved no easy matter. For the bulk of our legal 
history, the case or controversy standard was defined, if at all, by 
analogy to the common law system of adjudication.24 Occasionally, 
decisions construing article III suggested prohibitions against issu-
ing advisory opinions25 and entertaining collusive suits,26 and even 
constitutional limits on the reach of the Declaratory Judgment 
Act.27 Primarily, however, the federal courts measured their power 
to decide cases by asking whether the litigant asserted a legal in-
•• See, e.g., Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Abusing Standing: A Comment on Allen u. Wright, 133 
U. Pa. L. Rev. 635 (1985); Mark V. Tushnet, The New Law of Standing: A Plea for Aban-
donment, 62 Cornell L. Rev. 663 (1977) . 
•• 454 u.s. 464, 472 (1982). 
21 Id. 
•• Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 218-19 (1974). See also 
Richardson, 418 U.S. at 194 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell is the principal architect 
of the constitutional standard of particularized injury. For the prime example, see Warth, 
422 U.S. at 490. 
•• Max Farrand, 2 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 at 430 (1911). 
•• See generally Joseph Vining, Legal Identity: The Coming of Age of Public Law 
(1978). 
•• See Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911); Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103 
(1969). The first example is the famous August 8, 1793, letter from Chief Justice John Jay to 
President George Washington refusing to render an advisory opinion on a treaty question, 
reprinted in Paul M. Bator, Paul J. Mishkin, David L. Shapiro, and Herbert Wechsler, Hart 
and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System 64-65 (2d ed. 1973). 
•• See, e.g., Johnson, 319 U.S. at 303-05 (collusive suit not a real case or controversy). 
•• See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937) (upholding constitutionality 
of Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934 as applied to "actual cases or controversies"). In part 
ll-B, I will argue that cases such as Haworth are most appropriately seen as standing deci-
sions, not as ripeness decisions. 
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terest recognized by the Constitution, statutes, or the common 
law.28 
But the expansion of "public law" litigation29 eventually 
forced the courts to stop interpreting the case or controversy stan-
dard by analogy to common law adjudication, and thus to abandon 
the legal interest test. 30 By the early 1970s, in Association of Data 
Processing v. Camp, the Supreme Court had scrapped the legal in-
terest test in favor of a simple demand for "injury in fact."31 Build-
ing on this foundation, the Burger Court regularly characterized 
the case or controversy mandate as a demand for "distinct and pal-
pable injury."32 The goal in turning to the harm standard was 
straightforward. The Court contended that its harm-based stan-
dard is a "means of 'defining the role assigned to the judiciary in a 
tripartite allocation of power.' "33 Absent litigants "who can show 
'injury in fact,' "34 the Court indicated, "the power 'is not judicial 
... in the sense in which judicial power is granted by the Consti-
tution to the Courts of the United States.' "35 Article III's "bedrock 
requirement"36 of individual harm, therefore, is the primary tool 
by which the Court has attempted to limit the purview of the fed-
eral tribunals to cases of a "judiciary nature." 
The injury test was adopted expressly to remove the article III 
"case" determination from the sway of the decision on the merits. 
In Data Processing, the Court declared that while "the 'legal inter-
est' test goes to the merits,"37 article III's core standing require-
•• See, e.g., Joint Anti-Facist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 151-53 
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
•• See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1281 (1976) (describing extensive changes in judicial function under "public law" liti-
gation from private model of two-party disputes). 
30 See Vining, Legal Identity at 26-27 (cited in note 24); Henry P. Monaghan, Constitu-
tional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 Yale L. J. 1363, 1368-71 (1973). 
31 397 U.S. 150, 152-53 (1970). In addition, under Data Processing the injury must he 
to an interest arguably within the "zone of interests" protected by the provision in question. 
Id. This standard looks much like the "legal interest" test, but now is based on prudential 
rather than constitutional concerns and, in practice, seldom poses a bar to jurisdiction. 
32 Warth, 422 U.S. at 501. Plaintiffs also have been required to assert that their injuries 
"fairly can be traced" to the defendant and are "likely to be redressed by a favorable deci-
sion." EKWRO, 426 U.S. at 38, 41. These requirements, I have argued, are logical extensions 
of the injury requirement: they ensure a sufficient relation between the harm on which the 
lawsuit is based and the particulars of the claim on the merits. See Nichol, 133 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. at 645-49 (cited in note 19). 
33 Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 474, quoting Flast, 392 U.S. at 95. 
3
' Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 473. 
3~ Id. at 471, quoting United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. 48 (1852). 
38 Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 471. 
37 397 U.S. at 153. 
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ment is "different."38 The constitutional standard "in no way de-
pends" on the substantive issues litigated or on the evaluation of 
the claim.39 Moreover, the demands of the case or controversy 
standard do not "diminish as the 'importance' of the claim ... 
increases,"40 nor do they countenance a "hierarchy of constitu-
tional values or a complementary 'sliding scale' "41 allowing easier 
access for some actions than for others. 
In short, the Burger Court's treatment of the case or contro-
versy requirement in the standing area-the area in which the 
Court has most fully articulated the requirements of article 
ill-casts the constitutional "case" demand as an objective, con-
crete, independent barrier to the exercise of judicial power. Re-
moved from the validity of the cause of action-its importance or 
attractiveness-article III provides a supposed42 freestanding trig-
ger to the employment of judicial authority while ostensibly avoid-
ing the "premature legal value judgments"43 that would follow 
from turning to the merits. 
The Burger Court's vision of article Ill also can be illuminated 
by considering the standing guidelines that the Court has imposed 
that are not required by the case or controversy mandate. Cases 
consistently point to a set of "prudential" principles"" restricting 
the availability of the federal forum. Claimants must, in the usual 
course, assert their own rights rather than those of third parties."5 
The Court will not consider "abstract questions of wide public sig-
nificance" or a mere "'generalized grievance' shared in substan-
tially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens."46 And a 
plaintiff's claim must fall within the "zone of interests to be pro-
tected or regulated by the ... guarantee in question."47 It is now 
"settled that such rules of self-restraint are not required by 
Art[icle] III but are 'judicially created overlays that Congress may 
•• Id. 
•• Richardson, 418 U.S. at 174, 180-81 (Powell, J., concurring). 
•• Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 484. 
•• Id. 
•• I have argued elsewhere that the injury determination is far more complex and mal-
leable than the Burger Court's article III rulings suggest. See Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Injury and 
the Disintegration of Article III, 74 Cal. L. Rev. (forthcoming 1987). 
•• William Burnham, Injury for Standing Purposes When Constitutional Rights Are 
Violated: Common Law Public Value Adjudication at Work, 13 Hastings Const. L. Q. 57, 
111 (1985). 
•• Warth, 422 U.S. at 498. 
•• Id. at 499. 
•• ld. at 499. See generally Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99-
100 (1979); Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 80. 
" Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 153. 
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strip away.' "48 
As a package, then, the modern standing decisions reveal an 
ascertainable portrait of both the purpose and the configuration of 
the case or controversy requirement of article III. Employing an 
overarching trigger based on individual harm, the injury standard 
ensures the existence of a constitutional case-and thus comports 
with the judicial power-without becoming embroiled in the par-
ticulars of the substantive claim. 
The third party, generalized grievance, and zone of interest 
rules each assume the existence of constitutionally recognized in-
jury. The third party and zone of interest tests explore the in-
tended beneficiaries of the substantive principles on which the 
cause of action is based; they attempt to ensure that appropriate 
parties control the decision to litigate.49 The Court cautions re-
straint in suits based on widely shared injuries so as to temper in-
terference with the operation of other branches of government 
when those injured may have the political power to protect 
themselves.110 
The Burger Court's portrait of article III is to this extent a 
reasonable one. It carves out for the case or controversy require-
ment a limited but vital role. The constitutional standard does not 
embody all that is good or valuable in jurisdictional decision mak-
ing. A variety of determinations are characterized as examples of 
prudent "self-governance"-allowing for a heavy dose of fact-based 
discretion and the essential involvement of legislative choice. Even 
more importantly, some jurisdictional rulings are spared the fate of 
being constitutional decisions. 
Only the heart of the inquiry-the admittedly complex111 in-
jury determination-is given constitutional status. It "states a lim-
~ itation on judicial power, not merely a factor to be balanced in the 
weighing of so-called 'prudential' considerations."112 According to 
the Court, "neither the counsels of prudence nor the policies im-
plicit in the 'case or controversy' requirement should be mistaken 
for the rigorous article III requirements themselves."113 As the fol-
lowing sections reveal, the multifaceted ripeness requirement IS 
difficult to square with such a stark portrait of article III. 
•• Richardson, 418 U.S. at 196 n.l8 (Powell, J., concurring), quoting Gerald Gunther 
and Noel T. Dowling, Cases and Materials on Constitutional Law 106 (8th ed. 1970). 
•• See Nichol, 72 Cal. L. Rev. at 95-98 (cited in note 15). 
•• See Warth, 422 U.S. at 501. 
"' See generally Nichol, 74 Cal. L. Rev. (cited in note 42). 
•• Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 475. 
•• Id. 
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II. RIPENESS 
The central principles of the ripeness doctrine are un-
problematic. The "basic rationale" of the ripeness requirement is 
"to prevent courts, through the avoidance of premature adjudica-
tion, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements" with 
other organs of government. 54 In Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 1515 
still characterized as the "leading discussion" of the doctrine, 156 the 
Court indicated that the question of ripeness turns on "the fitness 
of the issues for judicial decision" and the "hardship to the parties 
of withholding court consideration."157 
It is easy to conclude, with Professor Davis, that the approach 
of Abbott Laboratories provides an "excellent foundation" for the 
analysis of ripeness issues.158 Its open inquiry avoids both the rigid-
ity of prior ripeness law159 and the questionable systems of classifi-
cation that characterize other justiciability doctrines.60 
As the following sections reveal, ripeness analysis serves a va-
riety of goals and employs several distinct processes. Commenta-
tors have ordinarily approached the decisions either chronologi-
cally61 or by reviewing the nature of the factors shaping the various 
.. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967). Although Abbott Labora-
tories raised the possibility of a dispute between the courts and an administrative agency, 
the ripeness doctrine is likewise used to avoid disputes between the courts and other organs 
of government. See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 997-98 (1979) (Powell, J., con-
curring) (using ripeness principles to dismiss challenge to President's abrogation of treaty 
with Taiwan). 
66 387 u.s. 136 (1967). 
•• See Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Develop-
ment Commission, 461 U.S. 190, 201 (1983). 
17 Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 149. For examples of cases applying this formula, 
see Toilet Goods Assn. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158 (1967); EKWRO, 426 U.S. 26; Harrison v. 
PPG Industries, 446 U.S. 578 (1980); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agr. Products Co., 105 S.Ct. 
3325 (1985). 
•• Davis, 4 Administrative Law Treatise § 25:6 at 370 (cited in note 16). See also 
Wright, Miller, and Cooper, 13A Federal Practice at 112 (cited in note 16) (Abbott formula 
"generally satisfactory"). 
•• Compare, for example, the modern decisions with the analysis employed in Public 
Service Comm'n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1952) (declaratory judgment available 
only in cases that admit of "an immediato and definitive determination" of the legal rights 
of the parties) and International Longshoremen's Union v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222, 224 (1954) 
(declaratory relief not available "to obtain a court's assurance that a statute does not govem 
hypothetical situations that may or may not make the challenged statute applicable"). See 
also Pub. Util. Comm'n v. United Air Lines, 346 U.S. 402 (1953) (two-sentence dismissal of 
declaratory judgment suit without any analysis of the facts). But noto id. at 403 (Douglas, 
J., dissenting) (arguing that the case is "peculiarly one for declaratory judgment"). 
•• See Nichol, 72 Cal. L. Rev. at 73-82 (cited in note 15). (discussing "thinness and 
artificiality" of Burger Court's application of injury in fact standard in standing cases). 
11 See C. Douglas Floyd, The Justiciability Decisions of the Burger Court, 60 Notre 
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ripeness determinations.62 Although it may oversimplify the in-
quiry somewhat, my claim is that the bulk of the ripeness decisions 
fall into three interrelated, but analytically distinct categories. 
First, the ripeness doctrine has perhaps most frequently been 
used to measure the demands of substantive statutory or constitu-
tional causes of action. This application of the doctrine does not 
relate to jurisdictional power at all. Instead, it is an aspect of ac-
tionability analysis-that is, the determination of whether the liti-
gant has stated a claim on which relief can be granted. 63 Second, 
ripeness review often has been employed to determine whether the 
litigant's asserted harm is real and concrete rather than speculative 
and conjectural. This methodology parallels standing analysis. 
Third, the ripeness requirement has been used to serve the goals of 
prudent judicial decision making. In a series of decisions in which 
the Abbott Laboratories formula figures prominently, the Supreme 
Court has attempted to time the intervention of judicial power so 
as to ensure more accurate rulings by the courts and to allow the 
challenged government action to run its course more completely. 
For the most part, these goals and processes are distinct from 
those of the case or controversy requirement's injury determina-
tion. But the Supreme Court has been clear that, although the 
ripeness demand may have begun as an exercise in judicial discre-
tion, 64 it is now firmly planted in the Constitution. In a series of 
Dame L. Rev. 862, 922-36 (1985). 
•• See Wright, Miller, and Cooper, 13A Federal Practice at § 3532 (cited in note 16). 
•• See Fed. Rule Civil Proc. 12(b)(6). 
•• Earlier decisions distinguished the doctrines of standing, mootness, and ripeness 
from the core article III "case or controversy" requirement: 
The restriction of our jurisdiction to cases and controversies within the meaning of 
Article III of the Constitution . . . is not the sole limitation on the exercise of our 
appellate powers, especially in cases raising constitutional questions .... "The Court 
[has] developed, for its own governance in the cases admittedly within its jurisdiction, 
a series of rules under which it has avoided passing upon a large part of all the consti-
tutional questions pressed upon it for decision." ... 
The various doctrines of "standing," "ripeness," and "mootness" . . . are but sev-
eral manifestations-each having its own "varied application"-of the primary concep-
tion that federal judicial power is to be exercised ... only at the instance of one who is 
himself immediately harmed, or immediately threatened with harm, by the challenged 
action. 
Poe v. Ullman 367 U.S. 497, 502-03, 503-04 (1961) (citations and footnotes omitted), quoting 
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concur-
ring). For other cases characteri2ing ripeness in other than constitutional terms, see, for 
example, Toilet Goods Assn., 387 U.S. at 162-64 (interpretation of "final agency action" 
requirement under § 10 of Administrative Procedure Act); Columbia Broadcasting System 
v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 425 (1942); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
Of course, Justice Brandeis's classic concurrence in Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 346-47, labels 
ripeness as a prudential restraint. 
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cases dating from the mid-1970s, the Court has conflated the ripe-
ness inquiry and the case or controversy requirement of article III, 
repeatedly describing the ripeness inquiry as a "threshold" deter-
mination designed to measure whether the " 'actual controversy' 
... requirement imposed by Art[icle] III of the Constitution" is 
met.65 The decision in Babbitt v. Farm Workers, for example, em-
ployed the entire panoply of ripeness tools as aspects of the "case 
or controversy [requirement] within the meaning of Article III of 
the Constitution."66 It is this turn that I find troubling.67 
•• Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 458 (1974); Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426, 433 
(1975). See also Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 138 (1974) ("issues of 
ripeness involve, at least in part, the existence of a live 'Case or Controversy"); Hodel v. 
Virginia Surface Mining & Reel. Assn., 452 U.S. 264, 294 n.36 (1981) ("no justiciable case or 
controversy" because challenge to statute not ripe for judicial resolution). Compare the re-
lated requirement of "concreteness" as treated in Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell Oil 
Co., 444 U.S. 572, 582-83 (1980) (article III case or controversy must be a "concrete contro-
versy"); Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 297-98 (article III requires "a dispute definite and concrete, not 
hypothetical and abstract"); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 128 (1973) (allegation of indirect 
injury not sufficient to present case or controversy under article III); California v. LaRue, 
409 U.S. 109, 112-13 n.3 (1972) (article III requires a "present and concrete controversy"). 
" 442 U.S. 289, 297 (1979). Babbitt employed substantive/actionability ripeness to con-
clude that a vagueness challenge to a labor ordinance was timely. Id. at 303-04. It used 
injury/ripeness analysis to conclude that a challenge to a consumer publicity regulation was 
appropriate. Id. at 300-02. And, it employed ripeness as a tool for factual specificity to reject 
a challenge to the organizer access provisions of the ordinance on the ground that it was not 
yet mature. Id. at 300, 303-04. 
Prior to Babbitt, one still could have hoped that only part of the ripeness doctrine was 
brought within article III. For example, in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), the Court 
purported to distinguish between article III and "problems of prematurity and abstract-
ness.'' ld. at 114. If that distinction had stood, the decisions could be read to constitutional-
ize only the injury/ripeness determination. Buckley involved an express statutory grant of 
jurisdiction "intended to provide judicial review to the extent permitted by Art. Ill," id. at 
12, and since the case involved a "real and substantial controversy," the Court accordingly 
held the claim involved to be justiciable. Id. at 117-18. In standing law as well, the Court has 
applied its standards liberally in instances where Congress evinced similar intent. See, e.g., 
Gladstone, Realtors, 441 U.S. 91 and Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 
(1972) (both holding that plaintiffs had standing under the Fair Housing Act of 1968, be-
cause Congress intended standing under the Act to extend to the limits permitted by article 
III). 
But after Babbitt, it seems that the Court will treat all uses of ripeness as equally com-
manded by article III. Moreover, Hodel, 452 U.S. at 293-97, and Steffel, 415 U.S. at 458-60, 
employed substantive ripeness analysis as an article III endeavor. While Abbott Laborato-
ries was originally an administrative law decision, most recently, in Pacific Gas & Elec., 461 
U.S. 191, the Court characterized Abbott Laboratories as the "leading discussion" of the 
ripeness doctrine while citing a case holding the ripeness standard to be part of article III. 
461 U.S. at 201, citing Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102. 
41 I realize that some cases predating the Burger Court appear to treat ripeness as a 
demand of article III, especially cases involving the interpretation and constitutionality of 
the Declaratory Judgment Act. For example, see Golden, 394 U.S. at 103; Haworth, 300 U.S. 
at 239-40. Others at least read the Declaratory Judgment Act in conformity with article III. 
See Wycoff, 344 U.S. 237. Some decisions, on the other hand, are simply unclear. See United 
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In the next three sections, I sort out in greater detail the three 
uses of ripeness doctrine identified above and consider their rela-
tion to the dictates of article III. 
A. Ripeness and the Demands of Substantive Law 
A comparison of two cases reviewed in the Supreme Court's 
1984 term indicates that the ripeness determination is more com-
plex than the apparent simplicity of the Abbott Laboratories 
formula might suggest. In Williamson County Regional Planning 
v. Hamilton Bank,68 the Court ruled that the plaintiff's fifth 
amendment takings claim challenging various zoning regulations 
was premature because the plaintiff had yet to institute an inverse 
condemnation action under local law and had also failed to apply 
for zoning variances.69 Prior to the Court's determination, however, 
the plaintiff bank and its predecessor in interest, a real estate de-
veloper, had engaged in a fairly extensive series of transactions 
with the zoning commission whose decision the bank sought to 
overturn. 
Some twelve years before the Court's ruling, the developer had 
submitted a preliminary plat that was approved by the Planning 
Commission. Based upon that acceptance, the developer conveyed 
to the county a "permanent open space easement" for a golf course 
and spent approximately $3,000,000 building the golf course and 
$500,000 installing a sewer system. Six years after the acceptance 
of the preliminary plat, the zoning commission gave final approval 
to the permanent plat. Shortly thereafter, however, the commis-
sion changed its regulations and rejected the previously accepted 
plat. When the developer, at the commission's request, submitted a 
revised plat, the commission rejected it as well.70 The developer 
Air Lines, 346 U.S. 402 (per curiam denial of declaratory relief, simply citing Wycoff). Yet, 
before the string of cases cited in note 65 above, the constitutionalization of ripeness was far 
from certain. An abundance of pre-Burger Court decisions characterize ripeness in other 
than constitutional terms. For examples, see note 64 above. 
My claim is that the constitutionalization of ripeness is unfortunate. I am less con-
cerned with laying blame for the problem than with pointing out jurisprudential shortcom-
ings. I do, however, attribute the problem to the Burger Court for two reasons. First, in the 
Burger era, the Court made explicit what was before unclear: ripeness is part of article III. 
Second, the Burger Court's decision, in Data Processing, to make standing law's injury re-
quirement the core component of article III has rendered any tie of the ripeness doctrine to 
the case or controversy requirement redundant. I discuss this second point in part 11-B 
below. 
•• 473 U.S. 172, 105 S.Ct. 3108 (1985). 
•• 105 S.Ct. at 3119-22. 
•• Id. at 3112-14. 
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next appealed to the county zoning board, which reversed the deci-
sion of the commission. On remand, however, the commission de-
termined that the county board lacked jurisdiction to hear com-
mission appeals. The commission thus stood by its earlier ruling 
rejecting the plat. At this point, the bank (now the owner) sought 
relief in federal court71-and its case was ruled premature.72 
The plaintiffs in National Gay Task Force v. Board of Educa-
tion of the City of Oklahoma City78 had a considerably easier time 
of it. There the plaintiffs, whose membership included teachers in 
the Oklahoma public school system,74 challenged a newly enacted 
Oklahoma statute that made teachers' advocacy or promotion of 
"public or private homosexual activity"75 censurable. The record 
did not reflect how the statute would actually have been enforced; 
nor did it identify the specific activity, prohibited by the statute, 
in which the litigants hoped to engage. No limiting construction 
had been sought in the state courts, nor was any disciplinary ac-
tion instituted or threatened. Yet the Tenth Circuit proceeded to 
strike down the advocacy section of the statute without analyzing 
the ripeness issue. The Supreme Court split four to four, thus af-
firming (without opinion) the decision below. Most surprisingly, 
perhaps, it is fair to say that both Hamilton Bank and National 
Gay Task Force were correctly decided under present ripeness 
principles. 76 
What is the measure of an independent constitutional barrier 
that requires one litigant to pursue his claims for years with local 
decision makers at great expense in order to bring his federal ac-
tion to maturity, while another's action is thought to be ripe at the 
mere enactment of the regulation challenged? The contrast be-
tween the jurisdictional hurdles applied in Hamilton Bank and 
National Gay Task Force highlights the variable nature of the 
ripeness doctrine. 
In fact, the cases tell us far more about the demands of the 
takings clause and the first amendment, respectively, than about 
the requisites of article ill. The ripeness requirement consistently 
has been molded to meet the dictates of the substantive claim on 
the merits. For several decades, the Court has allowed pre-enforce-
71 Id. 
•• Id. at 3119-22. 
•• 729 F.2d 1270 (lOth Cir. 1984), aff'd without opinion, 470 U.S. 903 (1985). 
•• 729 F.2d at 1272. 
•• Id. 
•• See text at notes 77-84 and 101 below. 
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ment challenges to laws regulating speech. Laws threatening sanc-
tions for expression are said to "chill" potential speech.77 Rather 
than force citizens to curtail the exercise of their asserted first 
amendment rights in order to avoid prosecution, courts have per-
mitted facial challenges to regulations of expression even before 
the institution of other legal proceedings.78 Thus, the plaintiffs in 
National Gay Task Force appropriately could assert concrete, pre-
sent injury to their interests in free expression with the mere pas-
sage of the Oklahoma advocacy statute. As the Supreme Court 
ruled in Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 79 it is not permissible to 
inhibit first amendment expression by forcing a teacher to "guess 
what conduct or utterance may lose him his position" by violating 
a "complicated and intricate scheme" of regulation.80 
The law of the takings clause of the fifth amendment, how-
ever, has followed a very different path. The Supreme Court has 
characterized the takings inquiry as turning on "ad hoc factual" 
determinations directed to "particular estimates of [the] economic 
impact" on the property in question.81 The Court has also ruled it 
"particularly important" in takings cases that adjudication take 
place in a concrete factual setting. 82 The possibility of an adminis-
trative solution, of course, may alter the magnitude of the property 
diminution. Thus, part of the concrete factual setting necessary to 
the demonstration of a takings claim, apparently, is a showing that 
the regulatory authority would deny approval for all uses that 
would enable the plaintiff to obtain a "reasonable return" on its 
investment.88 Since the developer in Hamilton Bank had failed to 
exhaust all avenues afforded by local zoning ordinances, the claim 
was ruled premature. 
77 See, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 604 (1967); N.A.A.C.P. v. But-
ton, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 66-67 (1963). But 
contrast Tatum, 408 U.S. at 11-15, where-this time employing standing analysis-the 
Court held that absent threat of sanction, a claim that an alleged illegal domestic surveil-
lance program chilled the plaintiff's speech did not create a justiciable controversy. 
78 See, e.g., Steffel, 415 U.S. at 459 • 
•• 385 u.s. 589 (1967). 
80 Id. at 604. 
81 Hodel, 452 U.S. at 295. 
82 ld. at 295-96. 
83 Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 136 (1978). As the 
Supreme Court ruled in its latest term: 
It follows from the nature of a regulatory takings claim that an essential prerequisite to 
its assertion is a final and authoritative determination of the type and intensity of 
development legally permitted on the subject property. A court cannot determine 
whether a regulation has gone "too far" unless it knows how far the regulation goes. 
MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 106 S.Ct. 2561, 2566 (1986). 
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In short, while the first amendment allows citizens to attack 
regulations that may inhibit their speech even before such 
regulations have been enforced, the takings clause demands a 
showing by the challenger that the regulating authority has fore-
closed all economically viable options. It is obviously more difficult, 
therefore, to present a ripe takings claim than a ripe first amend-
ment challenge. 84 
The central reason for the distinction between the two lines of 
cases is that the ripeness determination is inescapably intertwined 
with both the substance of the claim on the merits and the proce-
dural posture of the case on review. Whereas free speech85 and 
electoral86 challenges have faced minimal ripeness hurdles, claims 
based on the freedom of association,87 equal protection,88 due pro-
cess,89 the fourth amendment,90 and the right to travel91 have been 
ruled context-dependent and therefore subject to more stringent 
ripeness demands. Broad-based facial attacks on legislative re-
gimes, while less likely to prevail on the merits, have faced little 
difficulty with the ripeness standard. 92 The common theme of such 
rulings is the examination of what it takes to state a concrete cause 
of action under the substantive principles upon which the claim is 
based. As Professor Vining has written, the "court actually does 
make a decision on the merits when it purports to choose the con-
text in which the decision will be made."93 
The interplay between ripeness and the substance of the claim 
•• Compare Hodel, 452 U.S. 264 (takings challenge to federal statute regulating surface 
mining dismissed as unripe challenge), with Steffel, 415 U.S. 452, and Keyishian, 385 U.S. 
589 (first amendment claims held justiciable even at pre-enforcement stage). 
•• Bantam Books, 372 U.S. at 66; Planned Parenthood Ass'n. of Chicago v. Kempiners, 
700 F.2d 1115, 1122 (7th Cir. 1983); Fernandes v. Limmer, 663 F.2d 619, 625 (5th Cir. 1981); 
Spartacus Youth League v. Board of Trustees of Illinois Industrial University, 502 F.Supp. 
789, 796-97 (N.D. Ill. 1980). 
•• See Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 301; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 117-18; Morial v. Judiciary Com-
mission, 565 F.2d 295, 298 (5th Cir. 1977). 
87 California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 55-56 (1974). 
" Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 489, 504 (1982). 
•• Southland Royalty Co. v. Navaho Tribe of Indians, 715 F.2d 486, 491 (lOth Cir. 
1983). 
•• Ellwest Stereo Theatres, Inc. v. Wenner, 681 F.2d 1243, 1248 (9th Cir. 1982). 
01 Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1965). 
•• See, e.g., National Gay Task Force, 470 U.S. 903; Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 
U.S. 43, 45-46 (1961). See also Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952) (reviewing 
constitutionality of state antisubversive law over dissent by Justice Frankfurter arguing that 
case was not yet ripe). 
•• G. Joseph Vining, Direct Judicial Review and the Doctrine of Ripeness in Adminis-
trative Law, 69 Mich. L. Rev. 1443, 1522 (1971). 
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is illustrated by Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates.94 
There, a vendor challenged a statute prohibiting the sale of materi-
als "designed or marketed for use with illegal cannabis or drugs.''9~ 
The attack was multifaceted. Flipside alleged that the provision 
was both vague and overbroad under first amendment guidelines. 
It also claimed that the statute could give rise to a pattern of dis-
criminatory enforcement.96 The Supreme Court considered, andre-
jected, the vagueness and overbreadth claims. It held that the reg-
ulation satisfied specificity demands, and that the overbreadth 
doctrine does not apply to commercial speech. The equal protec-
tion challenge, however, was dismissed on ripeness grounds. Al-
though the likelihood of discriminatory application was substan-
tial, the Court refused to address the problem at the pre-
enforcement stage. Instead, it recognized that opportunities were 
available for clarification by administrative regulation and that 
there would be sufficient time to consider any specific claim of dis-
criminatory enforcement when the village actually attempted such 
enforcement. 97 
Since Flipside had been advised by local officials not to sell 
various products thought to be prohibited by the statute,98 a suffi-
cient controversy was presented to allow the vagueness and over-
breadth claims to be determined. The law of the first amendment 
demanded no more than that the Court examine the face of the 
statute to settle the substantive challenge. The rejection of the at-
tack based on equal protection turned on substantive grounds as 
well. The Court implicitly ruled that a cause of action based on 
discriminatory enforcement demands the demonstration of specific 
instances of harassment.99 Also implicitly, of course, the Court con-
cluded that neither the equal protection clause nor the first 
amendment invalidate a statute that merely poses a substantial 
risk of discriminatory enforcement. In other factual contexts, how-
ever, such arguments have prevailed.100 
94 455 u.s. 489 (1982). 
9
" ld. at 492. 
96 ld. at 494, 503. 
97 ld. at 497-504. 
98 ld. at 493. 
90 Id. at 503-06 & n.21. 
100 See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 557-58 (1965) (striking down statute prohibiting 
"obstruction of public passages" as leaving government officials with "unbridled discre-
tion"); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 56, 58-59 (1965) (striking down film censorship 
statute as providing insufficient procedural safeguards to avoid inhibiting expression); 
Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450-51 (1938) (striking down municipal ordinance requiring 
permit for distribution of literature of any kind). 
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The point here, of course, is not that the Court came to the 
wrong conclusion in Flipside, but that its ripeness determinations 
were substance through and through. The litigant's claims were ei-
ther accepted or rejected not because of some constitutional bar-
rier to the exercise of judicial power, but because in an exercise of 
judicial power the justices ruled that no claim for relief had been 
pleaded and proven.101 The Hamilton Bank decision, also employ-
ing ripeness analysis, came to a similar conclusion about the tak-
ings clause. The plaintiff in Hamilton Bank could present no ripe 
takings claim until all local avenues of relief had been pursued. In 
both instances, the Court concluded that no constitutional viola-
tion had been shown. 
To claim that ripeness decisions are often substantive rulings 
in another form is not to argue that this use of the doctrine is ille-
gitimate. It seems likely that Professor Bickel had it right when he 
wrote that the ripeness determination "must depend on at least an 
initial judgment of the merits."102 It may well be that some of the 
cases rejected as unripe for lack of concrete application103 should 
have been dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief 
could be granted, rather than for lack of jurisdiction.104 But the 
ripeness formula at least suggests that the legal shortcoming is one 
of timing or factual development. It implies to the shunned litigant 
that she may eventually have a cognizable claim. 
It seems to me a major mistake, however, to confuse this sort 
of inquiry with the application of a constitutional barrier to the 
exercise of judicial power. The Burger Court treated the article III 
case or controversy requirement as an independent, objective limi-
tation on judicial authority. The necessary implication of the 
Court's moves to constitutionalize the ripeness doctrine, therefore, 
is an assertion that the judiciary has no power to address the "pre-
mature" issues considered in the ripeness cases. When the Court 
uses the ripeness standard in decisions such as those discussed 
above, however, it does make a judgment on the merits. By ac-
101 The Court in Flipside made no claim to be applying any article III requirement. 
Nevertheless, elsewhere it has made clear that it intends to constitutionalize this aspect of 
ripeness analysis which concentrates on the substantive claim. The decision in Babbitt, for 
example, employed substantive or actionability ripeness to conclude that a challenge to an 
allegedly vague labor ordinance was timely. 442 U.S. at 303·04. For other similar applica· 
tions of ripeness analysis, see Hodel, 452 U.S. at 293-97; Steffel, 415 U.S. at 458-59. 
102 Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 135 (1962). 
103 See, e.g., Hamilton Bank, 105 S.Ct. at 3116-22; Hodel, 452 U.S. 264. 
1 
.. Fed. Rule Civil Proc. 12(b)(6) provides for dismissal of suits for "failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted." 
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cepting pre-enforcement facial challenges in some substantive ar-
eas while demanding precise factual specificity in others, the Court 
hones and adjusts its exercise of substantive review. It is probably 
a mistake to characterize this method of analysis as jurisdictional 
at all. It certainly cannot be considered a reasonable interpretation 
of article III. The first problem with the Court's constitutionaliza-
tion of ripeness analysis, therefore, is that it is inconsistent with 
much of the actual operation of the doctrine. 
B. Ripeness and the Requirement of Actual Injury 
Not every inquiry subsumed under the "compendious"105 label 
of ripeness constitutes substantive review. A substantial number of 
ripeness cases ask whether the plaintiff has suffered harm or threat 
of harm that is "direct and immediate,"106 rather than conjectural, 
hypothetical, or remote. 107 Because the federal courts may not is-
sue advisory opinions, the ripeness requirement demands that the 
litigant show that he actually has been hurt-in immediate 
terms-by the actions of the defendant. Clearly this branch of 
ripeness analysis is jurisdictional in nature. It may be argued as 
well that the "real and immediate" standard involves the appropri-
ate scope of article III "judicial Power."108 
By applying a more sensitive measurement of concrete injury, 
the Court has substantially liberalized access to judicial review 
over the past three decades. Gradually, the Court has alleviated 
the traditional dilemma of the federal plaintiff seeking to challenge 
the constitutionality of government regulation. No longer do the 
principles of federal jurisdiction require that he become a law-
breaker in order to get into court.109 Ultimately, the Supreme 
Court has concluded, with Professor Jaffe, that "even a wrongdoer 
10
• Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch at 123 (cited in note 102). 
108 Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 152. See also City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 
U.S. 95, 102 (1983); Steffel, 415 U.S. at 459; Poe, 367 U.S. at 501-04. For similar require-
ments, see Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 298 (plaintiff must show "realistic danger of direct injury"); 
Lake Carriers Assn. v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 506 (1972) (construing "actual contro-
versy" requirement of Declaratory Judgment Act). 
107 See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 690 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring) 
(injury teo remote); Ellis, 421 U.S. at 434 (no "genuine threat"); Roe, 410 U.S. at 128 (injury 
to marital happiness "indirect" and "speculative"). 
108 U.S. Const. art. III. 
108 Contrast Lake Carriers Assn., 406 U.S. 498 (pre-enforcement challenge to state 
water pollution control statute presented "actual controversy" within meaning of Declara-
tory Judgment Act) with Longshoremen's Union, 347 U.S. 222 (dismissing as unripe a pre-
enforcement challenge to construction of immigration statute that would treat plaintiff's 
members as aliens entering United States for first time). 
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is entitled to know his rights."110 Moreover, ripeness decisions re-
peatedly have recognized the present harms that flow from the 
threat of future sanction.m 
Courts have used the ripeness standard to deny jurisdiction 
where the plaintiffs have not, at least in the jurisdictional sense, 
suffered real injury. The ripeness barrier has prevented review, for 
example, of an assertedly dormant statute proscribing the use of 
contraceptives.112 In other instances, courts have held contingent 
harms too remote to support jurisdiction.113 Plaintiffs deemed 
merely to have searched the statute books for grievances to assert 
against the government have been rejected.114 The Court also has 
ruled that victims of government action that allegedly inhibits free 
expression, but does not threaten legal sanction, have failed to 
demonstrate immediate injury.115 Finally, a federal court has ruled 
that no concrete injury is established on the basis of uncertainty 
whether a statute may be applicable to a plaintiff in the future.116 
To my mind, the Supreme Court has not always hit home in 
its measurement of actual injury. In Roe v. Wade, for example, the 
Court characterized as contingent and speculative the injury suf-
fered by a married couple, who feared the failure of contraceptive 
devices and to whom pregnancy posed health risks, as the result of 
a restrictive abortion statute.117 But certainly the abortion ban im-
posed real and present limitations on the couple's sexual intimacy. 
More surprisingly, in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, the Court re-
110 Louis L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 417 (1965). 
111 See Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 62 (1976); United 
States v. Geophysical Corp., 732 F.2d 693, 698-99 (9th Cir. 1984). 
112 Poe, 367 U.S. at 501-09. When the statute later was enforced, the Court struck it 
down in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
m United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89-90 (1947); Atlanta Gas Light Co. 
v. U.S. Dept. of Energy, 666 F.2d 1359, 1370 (11th Cir. 1982). 
114 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41-42 (1971); United Presbyterian Church in the 
U.S.A. v. Reagan, 738 F.2d 1375, 1378-79 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
115 Tatum, 408 U.S. at 13-14. The Court distinguished Keyishian on the ground that 
the plaintiffs there had actually been fired or threatened with firing. ld. at 12. 
118 J.N.S., Inc. v. State of Ind., 712 F.2d 303, 305-06 (7th Cir. 1983). The J.N.S. case 
illustrates the confusion existing in the federal courts regarding the roles of the case or 
controversy requirement, standing, and ripeness. The Seventh Circuit reviewed the relevant 
cases on article III and standing, id. at 305, and then simply concluded : "Whether couched 
in terms of standing (the party bringing the suit) or ripeness (the timing of the suit), it is 
clear that this plaintiff does not have sufficient stake in the outcome of this action at this 
time to satisfy the case or controversy requirement of Article III." Id. at 306 (emphasis in 
original). 
111 410 U.S. at 128. Another plaintiff, who alleged that the restrictive abortion statute 
intruded upon her right to privacy as guaranteed by the due process clause, was given 
standing and, of course, ultimately prevailed on her claim. Id. at 124-25. 
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fused to hear an injunctive claim lodged by the victim of a nearly-
fatal police chokehold, since the plaintiff could not demonstrate 
that "he was likely to suffer future injury from the use of . . . 
chokeholds by police officers. "118 Again, the present injury sus-
tained from the continuing employment of the practice could eas-
ily have qualified as tangible. 
Regardless of these possible miscues, however, it seems clear 
that inquiry into the nature and reality of the injury asserted is a 
legitimate, if not essential, jurisdictional exercise. Under this ru-
bric, the courts may measure the actuality of the claimed triggers 
of federal power. 
The problem with this line of ripeness cases, therefore, is not 
the enterprise undertaken. Rather, it is doubtful that they are 
truly ripeness determinations at all. In measuring whether the liti-
gant has asserted an injury that is real and concrete rather than 
speculative and hypothetical, the ripeness inquiry merges almost 
c9mpletely with standing analysis. The standing requirement, the 
cornerstone of the Burger Court's article III jurisprudence, 119 de-
mands that a litigant show that he personally "has suffered some 
threatened or actual injury" as the result of the conduct of the 
defendant.120 This requirement of particularized actual injury re-
peatedly has been treated by the Court not only as constitutionally 
mandated, but as the very core of the standing determination.121 
What then is the distinction between the standing doctrine's 
demand for "threatened or actual injury" and the ripeness cases' 
focus on "direct and immediate" harm? Analytically, the two con-
cepts could be segregated, despite the similar phraseology of their 
standards. The standing doctrine might be used to analyze the na-
ture and magnitude of present injuries. Only if such harms could 
be considered concrete, objective, and judicially cognizable would 
the standing barrier be overcome. The ripeness requirement, on 
the other hand, would focus on the substantiality of threatened or 
actually pending future injuries. Applying injury analysis on a for-
ward-looking time frame, the ripeness demand would measure the 
present effects and hardships imposed by the threat of future gov-
118 461 u.s. 95, 105 (1983). 
118 The standing requirement has heen the tool that the Court has used most consist-
ently to measure the dictates of article III. See Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 471-76. See also 
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) ("[t]he Article III doctrine that requires a litigant 
to have 'standing' to invoke the power of a federal court is perhaps the most important" of 
the article III doctrines). 
120 Warth, 422 U.S. at 499. 
121 See Allen, 468 U.S. at 751; Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472; Warth, 422 U.S. at 501. 
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ernment action. In theory, therefore, each doctrine could serve dis-
tinct but related functions. 
It is clear, however, that no such line of demarcation can be 
located in the cases. The "natural" overlap between standing and 
ripeness analysis occurs in the measurement of the cognizability of 
contingent or threatened harms. In such cases, the Burger Court 
appears to have used the two lines of inquiry interchangeably. 
Laird v. Tatum, 122 for example, presented a challenge to the 
operation of a domestic army intelligence-gathering system. Be-
cause the plaintiffs could point to no threat of sanction resulting 
from the security operation, the Court characterized their claim as 
a naked allegation that the army might someday misuse the infor-
mation to the detriment of the plaintiffs.123 Employing standing 
analysis to dismiss the claim, the justices ruled that the plaintiffs 
had failed to demonstrate that they were " 'immediately in danger 
of sustaining a direct injury as a result of [the Army's] action'" 
and, therefore," 'could not invoke the judicial power to determine 
the validity of [the] action.' "124 In Planned Parenthood of Mis-
souri v. Danforth, 125 the Court similarly employed standing rather 
than ripeness principles, this time to determine that a group of 
doctors had alleged a "sufficiently direct threat of personal detri-
ment" to obtain pre-enforcement review of an allegedly restrictive 
abortion statute that had been enacted but had not yet taken ef-
fect when the action was filed.126 
In O'Shea v. Littleton127 and Rizzo v. Goode, 128 suits aimed at 
correcting future problems in the administration of criminal justice 
were dismissed on jurisdictional grounds. As if to emphasize the 
confusion, the Court in Rizzo simply concluded that the "requisite 
'personal stake' "129 to make out "the requisite Art[icle] III case or 
controversy"130 was lacking-without indicating whether it was the 
standing or the ripeness hurdle, or both, that had proven fatal.131 
,.. 408 u.s. 1 (1972). 
us Id. at 13. 
, .. Id., quoting Ex Parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937). 
, •• 428 u.s. 52 (1976). 
us Id. at 62. 
117 414 U.S. 488 (1974). 
, .. 423 u.s. 362 (1976). 
110 Id. at 372-73, quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). 
uo Id. at 371-72. See also Littleton, 414 U.S. at 493-94. 
m A number of courts of appeals decisions also appear to have used standing and ripe-
ness analysis interchangeably. See, e.g., Athens Lumber Co., Inc. v. Federal Election Com-
mission, 689 F.2d 1006, 1011-13 (11th Cir. 1982); Reeves v. McConn, 631 F.2d 377, 381 (5th 
Cir. 1980). 
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More recently, in Lyons, the Court relied on the standing doctrine 
to hold that a victim of a prior chokehold could appropriately pre-
sent a damage claim based upon his past injury, but could assert 
no "real and immediate" harm to justify enjoining the future use 
of the practice.132 Commentators have, not unreasonably, treated 
Lyons as a ripeness case.133 But the Court did not. 
This all appears, no doubt, as the rankest sort of debate over 
semantics. More, however, is at stake. It is likely that this confu-
sion between the two lines of inquiry has contributed to the Burger 
Court's inclination to constitutionalize ripeness. The Court has 
consistently maintained that standing's formula of injury, causa-
tion, and redressability is mandated by article III.134 If much of the 
ripeness determination is indistinguishable from the injury analy-
sis demanded by the standing doctrine, it follows easily that the 
ripeness hurdle is constitutionally commanded as well. It is my 
contention, though, that the determination of whether a litigant 
actually suffers real or threatened injury -is a task that "case or 
controversy" jurisprudence has allocated to the standing doctrine. 
The ripeness inquiry, on the other hand, is designed to serve goals 
quite separate from the injury requirement. 
Professor Wright has argued that "as compared to standing, 
ripeness assumes that an asserted injury is sufficient to support 
standing, but asks whether the injury is too contingent or remote 
to support present adjudication."135 A finding of actual or 
threatened injury sufficient for purposes of article III, therefore, is 
a first step, subsumed by the standing doctrine, in the examination 
of whether jurisdiction attaches. The ripeness standard, designed 
to be discretionary in nature, operates as an additional hurdle to 
the exercise of judicial power. Serving to fine-tune the decision-
making process of the federal courts rather than measure the de-
mands of substantive constitutional principle, ripeness analysis 
carries the banner of prudence rather than power. 
The Abbott Laboratories formula itself bears out this inter-
pretation. Balancing the "fitness of the issues for judicial decision" 
against the "hardship on the parties of withholding court consider-
132 Lyons," 461 U.S. at 110. 
133 See, e.g., Floyd, 60 Notre Dame L. Rev. at 929-30 (cited in note 61). This interpre-
tation of Lyons is understandable because the Court used the "direct and immediate" stan-
dard-normally part of the ripeness inquiry-as its guidepost in determining standing. Ly-
ons, 461 U.S. at 102. 
13
' See note 119 above. 
13
" Wright, Miller, and Cooper, 13A Federal Practice at 130 (cited in note 16). 
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ation"136 assumes the existence of concrete injury. The balancing 
formula then asks if the injury is of sufficient magnitude to over-
come problems of contingency or speculation in the decision on the 
merits. Professor Bickel described the relationship between the 
two methodologies in perhaps the clearest terms: 
To state the matter plainly, government action may well have 
hurt the individual plaintiff, so that his standing in the pure 
or constitutional sense is beyond doubt. . . . But the action he 
complains of may nevertheless be in its initial stages only; if 
he waits a little while longer, he will be hurt more. This 
sounds gratuitously harsh, but the damage may not be major 
or irremediable. The point is that, if litigation is postponed, 
the Court will have before it and will be able to use, both in 
forming and supporting its judgment, the full rather than 
merely the initial impact of the statute or executive measure 
whose constitutionality is in question. To put it in yet another 
way, pure standing ensures a minimum of concreteness; the 
other impure elements of standing and the concept of ripeness 
seek further concreteness, in varying conditions that cannot 
be described by a fixed constitutional generalization.137 
In the decades since Bickel wrote that passage, the Court con-
sistently has loosened the ripeness standard, asking less frequently 
that the litigant "wait a while longer" and "be hurt more." As part 
of the process of liberalization, however, it appears that the Court 
on occasion has fused the two lines of inquiry. It has employed 
ripeness to measure the "minimum of concreteness" thought to be 
demanded by article III. 
That first mistake is perhaps the cause of a second one: the 
conclusion that the ripeness doctrine itself springs from the article 
ill case or controversy requirement. Professor David Currie has 
written that while standing asks who is a proper party to litigate, 
ripeness asks "when a proper party may litigate."136 The Burger 
Court has stated in quite specific terms that whether one is a 
proper party for purposes of the case or controversy requirement 
depends on whether one is actually injured. Ripeness occasionally 
demands more of admittedly injured plaintiffs. It is, therefore, as 
Justice Brandeis claimed, a rule fashioned by the Court "for its 
own governance," shaping the decision-making process in cases 
u• Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 149. 
131 Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch at 123-24 (cited in note 102). 
138 David P. Currie, Federal Courts: Cases and Materials 71 (3d ed. 1982). 
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"confessedly within its jurisdiction."139 
C. Ripeness as a Tool of Judicial Decision Making 
Stripped of its ties to standing and the case or controversy 
requirement, ripeness is best understood as a malleable tool of ju-
dicial decision making serving a number of interrelated purposes. 
As discussed above,140 there is a desirable, perhaps even necessary, 
link between the ripeness determination and the substantive claim. 
So considered, the ripeness standard has been used to measure 
whether the litigant, in the case before the court, has set forth the 
essential elements of a mature challenge. The Supreme Court also 
may have used the ripeness standard, as Professor Bickel urged, to 
examine the ripeness not only "of the case, but of the ultimate 
issue itself . . . in the largest sense, and in the full political and 
historical context."141 Justice Powell's concq.rring opinion in Gold-
water v. Carter142 suggested this somewhat grander use of ripeness. 
In refusing to consider Senator Goldwater's constitutional objec-
tions to the revocation of a treaty with Taiwan, Justice Powell 
hinted that such substantial oversight of presidential authority 
should, at the least, occur only on a strong showing of necessity.143 
The opinion also can be read to go further, recognizing that the 
Court should refuse to entertain a dispute between the branches of 
government unless Congress forces its hand.144 
The balancing contemplated by Abbott Laboratories, however, 
includes a range of concerns broader than the dictates of the claim 
on the merits. Other considerations can caution against review. 
Ripeness analysis has been used, for example, as a tool by the 
Court to help ensure precision in judicial decision making and to 
prevent judicial intrusions on proper and efficient allocation of 
governmental powers. 
It is obviously permissible for a court to demand that one ask-
ing it to exercise powers of constitutional or statutory review 
demonstrate with clarity the case for employing judicial authority. 
It seems apparent, then, that a case is not ripe "for judicial deter-
mination if issues are unclear or needed facts are undeveloped."1415 
139 Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 346 (concurring opinion). 
140 See part II-A above. 
141 Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch at 124 (cited in note 102). 
142 444 U.S. 996, 997 (1979). The majority dismissed the Goldwater lawsuit in a per 
curiam opinion. 
143 I d. at 997. 
144 Id. at 998. 
14
• Davis, 4 Administrative Law Treatise § 25:11 at 385 (cited in note 16). 
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Rescue Army v. Municipal Court146 provides perhaps the leading 
example. There, the Court refused to entertain a constitutional 
challenge to a local prosecution. The appeal arose from a ruling on 
a demurrer and presented a particularly poor record: many of the 
statute's issues were inextricably intertwined, and many of the un-
derlying issues had yet to be resolved by the state courts. The 
shape in which the constitutional issues reached the Court was 
seen as an "insuperable obstacle to any exercise of jurisdiction."147 
The opinion indicated that a dispute is ripe only if the issues are 
presented in a "clean-cut and concrete form, unclouded by any se-
rious problem of construction relating either to the terms of the 
questioned legislation or to its interpretation by the state 
courts. "148 
In cases like Rescue Army, the judicial decision to wait is 
designed neither to ensure that the requisite harm exists to invoke 
jurisdiction nor to measure the demands of a particular claim on 
the merits. Injury, again, is assumed. As the Court ruled in Babbitt 
v. Farm Workers, adjudication may be postponed until a better 
record exists "[e]ven though a challenged statute is sure to work 
the injury alleged."149 The interest protected by the Court is its 
own. Litigation based upon hypothetical possibility rather than 
concrete fact is apt to be poor litigation. The demand for specific-
ity, therefore, stems from a judicial desire for better lawmaking. 
The District of Columbia Circuit made this point clearly in a 
recent ripeness ruling, Andrade v. Lauer. 150 The court concluded 
that the Abbott Laboratories formula required the judiciary to 
" 'balance its interest in deciding the issue in a more concrete set-
ting against the hardship to the parties caused by delaying re-
view.' "151 Analytically, therefore, this use of the ripeness doctrine 
is largely indistinguishable from the courts' employment of the 
panoply of other tools to assure the adequacy of the record and the 
requisite breadth of representation by the parties.152 Once actual 
injury for purposes of article III standing is shown, however, this 
... 331 u.s. 549 (1947). 
141 Id. at 574. 
148 Id. at 584. 
140 Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 300. 
••• 729 F.2d 1475 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
'"' Id. at 1480, quoting Webb v. Dep't of Health & Human Services, 696 F.2d 101, 106 
(D.C. Cir. 1982) (emphasis added). 
••• I have in mind especially the tools available to judges such as inviting intervention 
and amicus presentations and giving discretionary notice in class actions. See Mark V. 
Tushnet, The Sociology of Article III: A Response to Professor Brilmayer, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 
1698, 1707 (1980). 
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demand of ripeness analysis amounts to no more than a prudential 
counsel in factually ambiguous circumstances to "delay resolution 
. . . until a time closer to the actual occurrence of the disputed 
event" if a "better factual record might be available. "153 
Finally, the ripeness formula of Abbott Laboratories allows 
the courts to postpone interfering when necessary so that other 
branches of government, state and federal, may perform their 
functions unimpeded. Developed in the context of federal adminis-
trative law, the formula provides agencies "an opportunity to func-
tion-to iron out differences, to accommodate special problems, 
[and] to grant exemptions" before judicial intervention occurs.154 
Analogous problems arise when federal courts review the acts of 
state officials. The doctrine thus has been employed to limit judi-
cial examination of the decisions of state administrative/55 judi-
cial, 156 legislative, 157 and executive158 officers and federal adminis-
trative officers159 that the courts have considered still preliminary 
in some regard. The ripeness barrier thus allows federal courts to 
give due respect to the scope of responsibilities allocated to other 
government decision makers. It limits any judicial proclivity to 
"pre-empt and prejudge issues that are committed for initial deci-
sion to an administrative body or special tribunal. "160 
Of course, the standing doctrine's demand for "actual or 
threatened injury" carries the bulk of the burden in dismissing 
claims challenging government action that has yet to mature. A lit-
103 Regional Rail Reorganization Cases, 419 U.S. at 143. 
1 
.. Toilet Goods Assn., 387 U.S. at 200 (Fortas, J., concurring and dissenting). 
Employing the ripeness doctrine to allow other governmental decision makers "an op-
portunity to function . . . to accommodate special problems" obviously entails use of the 
doctrine to further interests in the separation of powers and federalism. There is no reason, 
however, that prudential jurisdictional devices should be precluded from serving the goals of 
federalism and separation of powers. When the Court ruled in Warth v. Seldin that pruden-
tial concerns weigh against the judiciary addressing "abstract issues of wide public signifi-
cance" or mere "generalized grievances," 422 U.S. at 499-500, I assume the justices sought to 
ensure an appropriate separation of powers. The rule in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 
(1971), limiting federal court injunctions against state criminal proceedings, is a nonconsti-
tutional jurisdictional principle designed to serve the ends of federalism. The same is true of 
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (limiting habeas corpus review of fourth amendment 
claims), and Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941) (abstention doctrine). 
100 Wheeler v. Barrera, 417 U.S. 402, 419-20 (1974); Wycoff, 344 U.S. at 246-47. 
108 Cross v. Lucius, 713 F.2d 153 (5th Cir. 1983); Peterson v. Sheran, 635 F.2d 1335 
(8th Cir. 1980); Bergstrom v. Bergstrom, 623 F.2d 517 (8th Cir. 1980). 
107 Young v. Klutznick, 652 F.2d 617, 626 (6th Cir. 1981); Chacon v. Granata, 515 F.2d 
922, 924-25 (5th Cir. 1975). 
108 Broderick v. di Grazia, 504 F.2d 643, 645 (1st Cir. 1974). 
100 Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. U.S. Dept. of Energy, 666 F.2d 1359, 1370 (11th Cir. 1982). 
180 Wycoff, 344 U.S. at 246. 
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igant is not hurt, for example, by a rule that is considered but not 
adopted. The ripeness standard provides an additional reason to 
hesitate from taking jurisdiction, however, in circumstances in 
which early judicial interference carries the implication that other 
decision makers would be inclined to disregard the litigant's 
interest. 
In Broderick v. di Grazia, 161 for example, the First Circuit dis-
missed a section 1983 action filed by police officers against the city 
police commissioner. The plaintiffs claimed that the commissioner, 
by declaring that "disciplinary cases against police officers should 
be handled on the assumption that policeman are guilty until 
proven innocent," effectively denied them due process in future 
administrative determinations.162 Even if the commissioner's ac-
tions threatened an injury to the plaintiffs, however, the court 
chose to defer to the eventual workings of local administrative and 
judicial process.163 Similar theories have led courts to postpone ad-
judication so as to leave open the "range of solutions" that legisla-
tive, executive, and judicial officials might consider.164 Federal 
101 504 F.2d 643 (1st Cir. 1974). 
102 Id. at 644-45. 
"' Id. at 645. 
"' See notes 155-61 and accompanying text above. See generally David L. Shapiro, Ju-
risdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 543 (1985). 
It may appear that by arguing in this section for the use of ripeness as a prudential, 
case-sensitive device, I attempt to reopen the classic debate between Professors Bickel and 
Gunther over whether courts have discretion to decline for prudential reasons to exercise 
jurisdiction properly given. See generally Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (cited in note 
102); Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the Passive Virtues-A Comment on Principle 
and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1964). 
The earliest statement in the debate was Cohens v. Virginia's dictum that "[w]e have 
no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which 
is not given." 19 U.S. 264, 404 (1821) (Marshall, C.J.). Bickel, however, believed that the 
Supreme Court, as the ultimate principled expositor of constitutional values, could appro-
priately exercise "prudence" in deciding when to decide. Bickel, The Least Dangerous 
Branch at 131-33. Accordingly, he thought the Court's refusal to scrutinize Virginia's an-
timiscegenation statute in Nairn v. Nairn, 350 U.S. 985 (1956), was justified because of the 
political realities of striking down such a statute in 1956. Bickel, The Least Dangerous 
Branch at 174. Gunther forcefully attacked this thesis. 64 Colum. L. Rev. at 11-13. 
I do not, and need not, embrace such a powerful vision of "prudence" here. The "dis-
cretion" described here under ripeness analysis does not include consideration of the ability 
of legal principle to withstand political fire. Much of the "discretion" in ripeness analysis is 
an inescapable aspect of judicial decision making. A court must decide, for example, 
whether first amendment claims are cognizable based on mere threat or only on the applica-
tion of actual sanctions. And it must have the power as well to demand a full and concrete 
record on which to base its decisions. See notes 145-53 and accompanying text above. 
One ripeness consideration identified here could be seen as contrary to the Cohens 
mandate: that of timing deference to other institutions of government. Even here, however, 
the duty to "exercise the jurisdiction which is given" begs the question of whether what is 
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courts, in short, are not the only entities charged with doing 
justice. 
III. RIPENESS AND ARTICLE III 
The benefits of disassociating ripeness from the case or con-
troversy requirement of article III are numerous. First, the fusion 
of the two doctrines threatens the comprehensibility of article III. 
The Burger Court tendered the theory-at least reasonable on its 
face-that its article III analysis "in no way depends on the merits 
of the ... contention that the particular conduct is illegal."~65 
Nor, according to the justices, does article III countenance the rec-
ognition of any hierarchy of constitutional rights, some of which 
pass the case or controversy hurdle more easily than others.166 It is 
difficult to lay the ripeness doctrine, which is so heavily inter-
twined with the substantive cause of action and the posture of the 
claim on the merits, alongside these article III case or controversy 
pronouncements. If the ripeness rulings are rooted in the Constitu-
tion, then the free expression and electoral rights decisions estab-
lish, at a minimum, the hierarchy of textual rights that the Court 
claims to eschew. 
Ripeness rulings vary quite naturally, I have argned, with the 
nature of the claim on the merits. It is not surprising, therefore, 
that litigants and judges, following the Supreme Court's constitu-
tionalization of the ripeness doctrine, are led to ask whether the 
article III case or controversy requirement vacillates according to 
the judge's view of the substantive cause. The Seventh Circuit, for 
example, recently has declared that the ripeness requirement is 
"less strictly construed in the first amendment context."167 Of 
course, that court correctly described the operation of the ripeness 
principle. So put, however, the characterization seems strange for a 
clear-cut, constitutionally imposed restriction on the power of the 
federal courts. 
Moreover, if the ripeness principle is to be subsumed within 
"given" includes some discretion. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch at 126. In any case, 
history has not heen kind to the simple Cohens mandate. See, e.g., Younger, 401 U.S. 37 
(prudential refusal to enjoin state prosecution, with many cases following it); Baker v. Carr, 
369 U.S. at 217 (multifactor description of "political question" analysis). It is not surprising 
that Justice Brandeis's concurring opinion in Ashwander has had a far greater impact on 
the law of federal courts than has Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Cohens. See notes 64, 
139 and accompanying text above. 
••• Warth, 422 U.S. at 500. 
••• Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 484. 
••• Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Chicago, 700 F.2d at 1122. 
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the case or controversy standard, one can easily begin to wonder 
what other doctrines of justiciability should enjoy that status. 
Standing jurisprudence has excluded the third party rule and the 
zone of interest test from constitutional status, largely because 
those standards assume the existence of injury and then proceed to 
foster other purposes that are substantive and prudential. 168 Ripe-
ness stands in an identical posture.169 Are the zone of interest test 
and the third party standing prohibition-despite the Court's con-
stant indications to the contrary170-now embraced by article III? 
Moreover, as discussed above, many ripeness cases do no more 
than analyze whether the litigant has stated a substantial federal 
question under applicable substantive principles. This use of the 
ripeness doctrine serves the same purpose as Rule 12(b)(l) and 
12(b)(6) defenses.171 While the takings clause demands the effec-
tive exhaustion of every possible avenue of redress, free expression 
claims often can be presented on the basis of potential abrogation. 
This difference is the product of the difference in the substantive, 
constitutional law of the first and fifth amendments. Of course it is 
possible to claim that federal courts lack the power to hear takings 
cases unless a litigant has lost at every turn in the locale. But de-
fining the elements of a cause of action is hardly the work of article 
III. Would we also say that a section 1983 claim against a law en-
forcement official that fails to allege that the defendant's action 
was taken under color of law should be dismissed for want of a 
case or controversy? 
The ripeness doctrine's demand for an adequate factual basis 
for decision making, typified most prominently by the Rescue 
Army decision, no doubt reflects sound judicial policy. However, if 
it flows from the case or controversy standard, what then of Rule 
19's indispensable party requirement172 or Rule 23(a)(4)'s demand 
that representative parties fairly protect the interests of the 
class?173 Both are valuable tools for effective judicial decision mak-
••• Nichol, 72 Cal. L. Rev. at 95-98 (cited in note 15). 
••• See discussion in text at notes 140-44 above. 
170 See, e.g., Warth, 422 U.S. at 499; Richardson, 418 U.S. at 196 n.18 (Powell, J., con-
curring); Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 153. 
171 These rules provide that a plaintiff's case can be dismissed for "lack of jurisdiction 
over the subject matter," Fed. Rule Civil Proc. 12(b)(1), or for "failure to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted," Fed. Rule Civil Proc. 12(b)(6). 
172 
"If a person ... cannot be made a party, the court shall determine whether in eq-
uity and good conscience the action should proceed among the parties before it or should be 
dismissed, the absent person heing thus regarded as indispensable." Fed. Rule Civil Proc. 
19(b). 
173 
"One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on 
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ing. Are they demanded by article III? 
These examples may exaggerate the point. Nonetheless, it is 
true that a doctrine as multifaceted as ripeness cannot easily be 
confined within the limited horizons of article III's case or contro-
versy doctrine. The Burger Court explained the case or controversy 
requirement strictly in terms of the demand for concrete injury to 
ensure the existence of a constitutional case. That venture alone 
has led to substantial complications.174 If the purview of the case 
or controversy requirement is now, without explanation, to be ex-
panded to include a plethora of unrelated interests, the future of 
the doctrine's comprehensibility is bleak. 
Nor is constitutionalization a good turn for the ripeness doc-
trine. First, it hardly serves clarity to link the ripeness principle to 
its unfortunate jurisdictional counterpart, the standing doctrine. 
The ripeness standard, when embodied in the Abbott Laboratories 
formula, has performed admirably, if not flawlessly.175 No one 
makes a similar claim for the standing doctrine, 176 which is plagued 
by vagueness and contradiction.177 It is, to speak charitably, a doc-
trine in search of both principle and rationale. Prudence counsels 
against permitting it to contaminate ripeness. 
More fundamentally, constitutionalizing ripeness is at odds 
with the flexible nature of the doctrine. The announcement that 
the premature adjudication of claims violates the Constitution sug-
gests a rigidity and uniformity of analysis, as well as an adherence 
to principle, that have little in common with ripeness review. Con-
sider an example. In Young v. Klutznick,178 the mayor and city of 
Detroit challenged findings made by the federal census, claiming 
that the census systematically undercounted minorities with the 
result that Detroit would be underrepresented in Congress. The 
Sixth Circuit dismissed the challenge as premature on the ground 
behalf of all only if . . . the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the 
interest of the class." Fed. Rule Civil Proc. 23(a)(4). 
m See generally Nichol, 72 Cal. L. Rev. 68 (cited in note 15) (exploring difficulties in 
current standing doctrine). 
176 For example, many cases under the Abbott Laboratories balancing formula under-
estimate the present harm flowing from future sanctions. Consider, for example, Citizens 
Action Coalition of Ind., Inc. v. Westfall, 582 F.Supp. 11 (S.D. Ind. 1983) (pre-enforcement 
challenge to ordinance prohibiting solicitation of funds after sunset); McCollester v. City of 
Keene, 668 F.2d 617 (1st Cir. 1982) (pre-enforcement challenge to local curfew); Boating 
Industry Assn. v. Marshall, 601 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1979) (suit for declaratory judgment as 
to coverage under Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, where Benefits 
Review Board had yet to construe scope of "maritime employment" coverage provision). 
176 See the authorities cited in Nichol, 72 Cal. L. Rev. at 68 n.3 (cited in note 15). 
177 See generally Nichol, 72 Cal. L. Rev. 68 (cited in note 15). 
178 652 F.2d 617 (6th Cir. 1981). 
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that the Michigan legislature had not yet expressed its reaction to 
the census. If Detroit's claims were true, Michigan might well 
choose to adjust an upcoming apportionment to accommodate the 
count deficiencies. Accordingly, the court of appeals ruled that the 
issues presented were not "as 'specific' or as 'particularized' " as 
they would be after the legislature acted.179 
Under the Abbott Laboratories formula, Young was probably 
a close call.180 The likelihood, or perhaps even the requirement, 
that the Michigan legislature would use federal census figures to 
reapportion would seem sufficiently strong to constitute hardship. 
Moreover, given the article I, section 2 "as nearly as practicable" 
standard, 181 underrepresentation could well have been rendered 
more difficult to challenge after legislative action. Yet, a forthcom-
ing apportionment scheme might have met Detroit's complaints, 
and judicial review of the census process could have proven partic-
ularly troublesome. But however Young should have been decided, 
it hardly aids the weighing process to give it constitutional 
overtones. 
Ripeness, as Young demonstrates, often calls for a uniquely 
case-oriented evaluation of the practical probabilities presented by 
the litigation. As Professor Jaffe argued, the doctrine demands 
"reasoned balancing of certain typical and relevant factors for and 
against the assumption of jurisdiction."182 If the ripeness calculus 
is rooted in the Constitution, however, the Abbott Laboratories 
balancing process certainly will be skewed. 
Tying ripeness to article III's case or controversy requirement 
effectively instructs a federal judge that if she misapplies the ripe-
ness standard and decides to reach the merits, she has not only 
erred but has also passed a constitutional limit and abused judicial 
power. The conscientious jurist thus might tend to dismiss any 
close call under the Abbott Laboratories formula to avoid even po-
tential usurpation. The careful weighing of factors both for and 
against review that Abbott Laboratories solicits would be tipped 
needlessly against plaintiffs. The wiser course, I suggest, is to re-
turn the ripeness doctrine to its prudential status. 
170 Id. at 626. 
110 Judge Keith filed a dissenting opinion in Young, disputing the majority's conten-
tions that the legislature might decide not to rely on the census figures and that the hard-
ship to the parties was speculative. ld. at 626. 
181 See Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 527 (1979); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 
1, 7-8 (1964). 
••• Jaffe, Judicial Control at 396 (cited in note 110). 
